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OPINION OF THE COURT 
           
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
 McKeesport Hospital brought this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
action against the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical 
Education (the "ACGME") and the Executive Secretary of its 
residency review committee for surgery, alleging that their 
withdrawal of the accreditation of the Hospital's general surgery 
residency program violated due process.  The district court 
entered a preliminary injunction blocking the accreditation 
withdrawal.  Because we conclude that the ACGME's conduct was not 
state action, we will reverse. 
I. 
 Pennsylvania's Medical Practice Act of 1985 (the 
"Act"), 63 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. §§ 422.1 - 422.25, requires that 
the admission standards, facilities, curricula, and training at 
any medical college or "medical training facility" in the 
Commonwealth "meet the requirements set by the [Pennsylvania 
State Board of Medicine (the "Board")] and any accrediting body 
which may be recognized by the board."  Id. §422.23(a).  The term 
"medical training facility" includes a medical college, hospital 
or other institution providing graduate medical training.  Id. 
§422.2.  Graduate medical training, which is commonly referred to 
as a residency, is defined in the Act as  
training approved or recognized by the board 
which is either: 
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(1) accredited as graduate medical 
education by any accrediting body 
recognized by the board for the 
purpose of accrediting graduate 
medical education. . . ; or 
(2) provided by a hospital 
accredited by any accrediting body 
recognized by the board and is 
acceptable to an American specialty 
board towards the training it 
requires for the certification it 
issues in a medical specialty or 
subspecialty. . . . 
Id. § 422.2. 
   The Act provides that  
[i]t shall be the duty of the board, in its 
discretion, periodically to ascertain the 
character of the instruction and the 
facilities possessed by each of the medical 
colleges and other medical training 
facilities offering or desiring to offer 
medical training in accordance with the 
requirements of this act. 
  
Id. § 422.23(b).  If the Board deems a program inadequate, "the 
board shall not recognize the education or degrees obtained from 
[it] during the period of inadequacy."  Id. § 422.23(c).  The 
Board must provide "due notice" to any institution found not to 
meet its standards.  Id.  Its actions, moreover, are "subject to 
the right of notice, hearing and adjudication, and the right to 
appeal therefrom, in accordance with the provisions of Title 2 of 
the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes (relating to administra-
tive law and procedure)."  Id. § 422.9.     
 The Board has by regulation recognized the ACGME as the 
accrediting body for graduate medical training programs in 
Pennsylvania.  The relevant regulation reads     
[t]he Board is responsible for determining 
the character of instruction and the 
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facilities possessed by each of the various 
medical education institutions and hospitals 
who carry out graduate medical education 
programs in this Commonwealth. The Council on 
Medical Education of the American Medical 
Association [the ACGME's predecessor] 
possesses the facilities and staffing 
required to perform evaluations of the 
qualifications of the various programs and 
also the mechanism for accreditation of 
acceptance programs. The Board and the 
Council . . . work cooperatively in 
evaluating and approving the training 
programs in this Commonwealth. A comity 
exists between the board and the Council . . 
. under which all intended observations of 
training programs for accreditation are 
communicated to the Board and the Board makes 
all requests for accreditation or 
investigation of training programs to the 
Council . . . .  If an investigation of the 
programs of the various institutions in this 
Commonwealth is to be conducted, the Board 
will provide one of its members or appoint an 
individual to accompany the investigator on 
each occasion.  An institution within this 
Commonwealth seeking approval of its programs 
by the Council . . . will be informed that 
action taken by the accrediting agency will 
be related to the Board.  
 
49 Pa. Code § 17.23.  The ACGME is a private, unincorporated 
association made up of representatives of five medical 
organizations -- the American Board of Medical Specialties, the 
American Medical Association, the American Hospital Association, 
the Association of American Medical Colleges, and the Council of 
Medical Specialty Societies -- that evaluates and accredits 
residency programs throughout the United States.   
 The ACGME's review is governed by its own set of 
standards, The Essentials of Accredited Residencies.  The ACGME 
has organized twenty-six residency review committees, one for 
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each of twenty-six medical specialties, that evaluate the 
programs in each area under these standards.  The committee for 
surgery, for example, is composed of 12 members appointed by the 
American Board of Surgery, the American College of Surgeons, and 
the American Medical Association.   
 The evaluation process begins when an application is 
submitted by the residency program's director.  The committee 
then sends a surveyor to the training facility to verify the 
information.  When reviewing a program in Pennsylvania, the ACGME 
notifies the Board of the visit, and a Board member or 
representative may accompany the surveyor to the facility.  The 
surveyor meets with faculty and students, reviews program data, 
and submits a report to the committee.  The submission of the 
report ends the site surveyor's role; he or she does not 
participate in the committee's decision.   
 The residency review committee then reviews the report 
and the program's file, and recommends either full accreditation, 
probation, or withdrawal of accreditation.  A training facility 
that is dissatisfied with the recommendation may request 
reconsideration by the committee and, if the committee adheres to 
its position, may seek a hearing before an appeals panel 
consisting of three directors of accredited residencies in the 
program's specialty.  A facility requesting an appeals panel 
hearing receives a list of potential members from which it may 
delete up to one-third of the candidates; the panel is 
constituted from those who remain.  The facility may submit 
additional information at both the reconsideration and appeal 
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stages and may be represented by counsel and present witnesses 
before the appeals panel.   
 The appeals panel's recommendation, the material it 
considered, and a transcript of its hearing are reviewed and 
either adopted or rejected by the ACGME's executive committee. 
The executive committee's determination is then voted on by the 
ACGME, whose decision is final.  A training facility whose 
accreditation is withdrawn may, however, reapply for ACGME 
accreditation at any time. 
                             II.  
 McKeesport Hospital, a community hospital in 
McKeesport, Pennsylvania, offers graduate medical training in 
several specialties, including general surgery.  The Hospital's 
general surgery residency program was first accredited by the 
ACGME's predecessor in 1961, although its ACGME accreditation has 
been provisional since 1979.  The program has had Board 
recognition since the Board began recognizing residency programs 
under the Act.  
 After a November 1990 site visit and its review, the 
ACGME's residency review committee for surgery recommended 
withdrawal of the program's accreditation, citing five 
deficiencies that allegedly rendered the program not in 
substantial compliance with The Essentials of Accredited 
Residencies.  The Hospital requested reconsideration and the 
committee, as a result, rescinded one of the deficiencies and 
extended the withdrawal's effective date by one year.  The 
Hospital appealed to an appeals panel, which held a hearing and 
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ultimately affirmed the committee's action.  The appeals panel's 
decision was adopted by the ACGME's executive committee and then 
by the entire ACGME, and the Hospital was notified that the 
program's ACGME accreditation would be withdrawn.    
 It does not appear that the ACGME communicated this 
decision to the Board.  Rather, the Hospital sought review of the 
ACGME's decision by the Board.  The Board, however, dismissed the 
case, concluding that it had no authority to intrude upon the 
ACGME's accreditation process and, because the Hospital had 
failed one of the two criteria to be a medical training facility 
in Pennsylvania, no jurisdiction over the Hospital's appeal.  The 
Hospital appealed the Board's dismissal to the Pennsylvania 
Commonwealth Court.   
 Before the Commonwealth Court rendered any decision in 
the case against the Board, however, the Hospital commenced this 
action against the ACGME, alleging that its decision to withdraw 
the program's accreditation lacked due process.0  After a three-
day hearing, the district court made extensive findings of fact 
and conclusions of law and granted the Hospital's motion for a 
preliminary injunction to prevent the accreditation withdrawal 
from becoming effective.  The ACGME appealed. 
 After this appeal was filed, the Commonwealth Court 
reversed the Board's dismissal order.  McKeesport Hosp. v. 
Pennsylvania State Bd. of Medicine, 628 A.2d 476 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 
                                                           
0In addition to the due process claim, the Hospital's complaint 
asserted federal antitrust and Pennsylvania contract law claims.  
The district court dismissed the antitrust and breach of contract 
counts; that dismissal is not at issue on appeal.   
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1993).  The Commonwealth Court determined that under the plain 
language of the Act, the Board is "the final arbiter of matters 
involving the accreditation of medical training facilities in 
Pennsylvania," and remanded the case to the Board for a hearing. 
Although the court agreed that the Board could not intervene in 
the ACGME's accreditation process, it disagreed that the ACGME's 
decision ended the Board's inquiry.  Id. at 479 & n.12.  The 
court stated: "[a]ccreditation by the ACGME merely is a tool 
which establishes critical facts leading to the Board's 
recognition" of a medical training facility.  Id. at 479.  The 
court ordered that the program remain recognized until the Board 
holds a hearing and issues a final order in the case.  Id.  The 
Board has filed a petition for allowance of appeal to the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, but that court has not yet granted or 
denied allocatur.  
  III. 
 The district court had jurisdiction over the Hospital's 
section 1983 claim under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3); we 
have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). 
We review the grant of a preliminary injunction to determine 
"whether there has been 'an abuse of discretion, a clear error of 
law, or a clear mistake on the facts.'"  Hoxworth v. Blinder, 
Robinson & Co., 903 F.2d 186, 198 (3d Cir. 1990) (citation 
omitted).  If we find either or both of the fundamental 
preliminary injunction requirements -- a likelihood of success on 
the merits and the probability of irreparable harm if relief is 
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not granted -- to be absent, the district court's order cannot be 
affirmed.  Id. 
  The Fourteenth Amendment protects individuals against 
government action.  To succeed on the merits of its Section 1983 
due process claim, the Hospital must therefore show that the 
action of the ACGME, a private entity, is "fairly attributable" 
to the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania.  Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 
457 U.S. 922, 937, 102 S. Ct. 2744, 2753 (1982).  The district 
court concluded, based on the "close nexus between the ACGME and 
the Board" and "the delegation of the Pennsylvania State Board of 
Medicine's duties to the ACGME"  that it was likely that the 
Hospital would be able to do so.  Our review of this legal 
determination, a prerequisite to the grant of the injunction, is 
plenary.  John F. Harkins Co. v. Waldinger Corp., 796 F.2d  657, 
658 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1059, 107 S. Ct. 939 
(1987).    
 The question of whether a private accrediting body's 
decision constitutes state action is, for us, one of first 
impression.  In cases involving accrediting organizations other 
than the ACGME, a number of courts have not found state action. 
Medical Inst. of Minn. v. National Ass'n of Trade & Technical 
Sch., 817 F.2d 1310, 1312-14 (8th Cir. 1987); Peoria Sch. of 
Business, Inc. v. Accrediting Council for Continuing Educ. & 
Training, 805 F. Supp. 579, 581-83 (N.D. Ill. 1992); Transporta-
tion Careers, Inc. v. National Home Study Council, 646 F. Supp. 
1474, 1478-79 (N.D. Ind. 1986); Dietz v. American Dental Ass'n, 
479 F. Supp. 554, 556 (E.D. Mich. 1979); Parsons College v. North 
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Central Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Sch., 271 F. Supp. 65, 70 
(N.D. Ill. 1967).  We have uncovered only one case where state 
action was found, Marjorie Webster Junior College v. Middle 
States Ass'n of Colleges & Secondary Sch., 302 F. Supp. 459 
(D.D.C. 1969), rev'd on other grounds, 432 F.2d 650 (D.C. Cir.), 
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965, 91 S. Ct. 367 (1970), but it was 
decided long before the Supreme Court's state action trilogy, 
Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 2744 (1982), 
Rendell-Baker v. Kohn, 457 U.S. 830, 102 S. Ct. 2764 (1982), and 
Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 102 S. Ct. 2777 (1982), which 
binds us now.   
 These cases do not answer our question as to the ACGME, 
because the state action determination is a "necessarily fact 
bound inquiry."  Lugar, 457 U.S. at 939, 102 S. Ct. at 2755. 
Before we begin that inquiry, however, we note that a New York 
state court indicated in dicta that an accreditation decision by 
the ACGME did not fall within the state action doctrine. 
Interfaith Medical Ctr. v. Sabiston, 133 Misc.2d 308, 309, 507 
N.Y.S.2d 124, 125 (1986), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on 
other grounds, 136 A.D.2d 238, 527 N.Y.S.2d 48 (2d Dept. 1988). 
Moreover, although a Maryland district court found an ACGME 
accreditation withdrawal to be state action in St. Agnes Hosp. v. 
Riddick, 668 F. Supp. 478, 479-82 (D. Md. 1987), it later 
questioned that conclusion in light of the Supreme Court's 
decision in National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Tarkanian, 488 
U.S. 179, 109 S. Ct. 454 (1988), but did not resolve the issue 
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because it ruled for the defendant on other grounds.  St. Agnes 
Hosp. v. Riddick, 748 F. Supp. 319, 326 (D. Md. 1990).   
    Because the Hospital's challenge is to the ACGME's 
decision to withdraw the program's accreditation alone, this case 
presents a "typical" state action issue -- "a private party has 
taken the decisive step that caused the [alleged] harm to the 
plaintiff, and the question is whether the state was sufficiently 
involved to treat that decisive conduct as state action" and thus 
permit the Hospital to sue the ACGME instead of the state Board. 
Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 192, 109 S. Ct. at 462.  State action may 
be found if the private party has acted with the help of or in 
concert with state officials.  Compare Edmonson v. Leesville 
Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991), and Lugar, 
supra, and Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 90 S. Ct. 
1598 (1970) (finding state action) with Flagg Bros., Inc. v. 
Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 98 S. Ct. 1729 (1978) (finding no state 
action).  Alternatively, it may be found when the private party 
has been "delegated . . . a power 'traditionally exclusively 
reserved to the State.'" Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 157, 98 S. Ct. 
at 1734 (quoting Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 
345, 352, 95 S. Ct. 449, 454 (1974)).  Finally, state action may 
be found if "there is a sufficiently close nexus between the 
state and the challenged action of the [private] entity so that 
the action of the latter may fairly be treated as that of the 
State itself."  Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351, 95 S. Ct. at 453.   
 We conclude on the undisputed facts of this case that 
the ACGME's withdrawal of the program's accreditation was not 
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state action.  First, it is certain that no state officials 
participated in the ACGME's accreditation withdrawal.  The 
applicable standard is one of "overt, significant assistance." 
Edmonson, 500 U.S. at ___, 111 S. Ct. at 2084.  Although a Board 
member did accompany the ACGME's site surveyor to the Hospital, 
he acted only as an observer, and played no part in the 
surveyor's inspection or in any stage of the ACGME's decision. 
This is not enough to make the ACGME's withdrawal decision state 
action.  Cf. Flagg Bros., 436 U.S. at 156-57, 98 S. Ct. at 1733-
34 (in a suit where the plaintiff was challenging a warehouse-
man's threat to sell her belongings pursuant to a state self-help 
statute, the fact that the city marshal had supervised the 
plaintiff's eviction and arranged for her possessions to be 
stored at the defendant's warehouse did not constitute overt 
official involvement in the challenged conduct).            
 The district court concluded that the Board delegated 
its duties to the ACGME, thereby rendering the ACGME's actions 
fairly attributable to the state.  We cannot agree.  As the 
Commonwealth Court's decision makes clear, under the Act the 
state Board remains ultimately responsible for approving medical 
training facilities in Pennsylvania.  Cf. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 
195-98, 109 S. Ct. at 464-65 (finding no delegation when the 
state retained the ability to adopt or reject a private 
association's decision).  Merely because the state Board deems 
its obligation met by following the ACGME's accreditation 
decisions does not imbue the ACGME with the authority of the 
state nor shift the responsibility from the state Board to the 
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ACGME.  The Board remains the state actor.  Moreover, even if a 
delegation occurred, that alone is insufficient.  For state 
action, the private actor must be exercising a power that is 
"'traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state[,]'" Blum, 
457 U.S. at 1005, 102 S. Ct. at 2786 -- for example, running an 
election, Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 73 S. Ct. 809 (1953), or 
providing a municipal park, Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296, 86 S. 
Ct. 486 (1966).  This, of course, is not the case here. 
 Medical residencies are a vital component of medical 
education, providing new doctors with a supervised transition 
"between the pure academics of medical school and the realities 
of medical practice."  Interfaith Medical Ctr. v. Sabiston, 136 
A.D.2d 238, 239, 527 N.Y.S.2d 48, 49 (2d Dept. 1988).  The 
evaluation and accreditation of medical education in this country 
is neither a traditional nor an exclusive state function. Rather, 
United States medical schools have been privately accredited for 
nearly a century.  See Rosemary Stevens, American Medicine and 
the Public Interest 55-73 (1971).  The ACGME's predecessor, the 
Council on Medical Education, began accrediting medical schools 
in 1906, Siirila v. Barrios, 398 Mich. 576, 614, 248 N.W.2d 171, 
186 (1976) (Williams, J., concurring), and has been reviewing and 
evaluating residency programs since the 1950s, Stevens, supra, at 
378-414.  That, in doing so, the ACGME serves the public interest 
does not make it a state actor.  Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. at 842, 
102 S. Ct. at 2772;  Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352-55, 95 S. Ct. at 
454-55.  Furthermore, although the state Board has taken on the 
function of approving Pennsylvania residency programs under the 
15 
Act, "that legislative policy choice in no way makes these 
services the exclusive province of the State."  Rendell-Baker, 
457 U.S. at 842, 102 S. Ct. at 2772. 
       The district court also found the connection between 
the state Board and the ACGME sufficient to turn the latter into 
a state actor.  We must disagree.  Sometimes, a state and an 
ostensibly private entity are so interdependent that state action 
will be found from their symbiotic relationship alone.  See 
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 81 S. Ct. 
856 (1961) (finding state action based on lease relationship that 
benefitted and obligated both parties).  The relationships of the 
University of Pittsburgh and Temple University to the Common-
wealth provide an example.  The Universities are designated by 
their governing legislation as "instrumentalit[ies] of the 
Commonwealth" and "State-related institution[s]."  These statutes 
provide for one-third of the Universities' voting trustees to be 
appointed by state officials and for several officials to serve 
as ex officio trustees; allow the Commonwealth to set tuition and 
fee schedules; promise annual appropriations, to be used as the 
Commonwealth specifies; impose stringent reporting requirements 
as to fiscal and other affairs; authorize the same capital 
development assistance as allowed wholly-owned state colleges; 
and create tax exemptions for income derived from bonds the 
Universities issue and loans secured by mortgages on their 
properties.  See Krynicky v. University of Pittsburgh, 742 F.2d 
94, 101-02 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1015, 105 S. 
Ct. 2018 (1985); Braden v. University of Pittsburgh, 552 F.2d 
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948, 959-61 (3d Cir. 1977).   The ACGME's relationship to the 
state is clearly distinguishable.  The ACGME is self- governed 
and financed, and its standards are independently set; the state 
Board simply recognizes and relies upon its expertise. 
 Alternatively, a connection between the state and a 
specific decision of a private entity may render that decision 
chargeable to the state.  See Jackson, 419 U.S. at 351, 95 S. Ct. 
at 453.  Under this approach, however, state action will be found 
only "when [the state] has exercised coercive power or has 
provided such significant encouragement, either overt or covert, 
that the [private decision] must in law be deemed that of the 
State[;]" "mere approval of or acquiescence in" the decision is 
not enough.  Blum, 457 U.S. at 1004, 102 S. Ct. at 2786.  The 
required state coercion or encouragement of the ACGME's actions 
is not present here. 
    The Hospital is challenging the ACGME's decision to 
withdraw the program's accreditation, not the Board's action in 
response.  The Board, however, does not control or regulate the 
ACGME's standard-setting or decision-making processes.  Although 
it recognizes them, state law does not dictate or influence those 
actions.  Rather, the ACGME's decisions are "judgments made by 
private parties according to . . . standards that are not 
established by the State."  Blum, 457 U.S. at 1008, 102 S. Ct. 
2788.  That the Board bases its approval of medical residency 
programs on ACGME accreditation does not turn the ACGME's 
decisions into state action. See Tarkanian, supra (state 
university's suspension of basketball coach in compliance with 
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NCAA recommendation did not convert NCAA decision into state 
action); Blum, supra (state officials' adjustment of Medicaid 
benefits in response to private nursing homes' decisions to 
discharge or transfer patients did not render the state 
responsible for those decisions).  To paraphrase the Supreme 
Court's conclusion in Tarkanian, it is more accurate to say that 
the Board conducts its approval of medical residency programs 
under color of the ACGME's policies than that those policies were 
developed and enforced under color of Pennsylvania law.  See 
Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 199, 109 S. Ct. at 466.         
IV. 
 Accordingly, because we conclude the ACGME performed no 
state action, we will vacate the preliminary injunction order and 
remand the cause to the district court.        
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BECKER, Circuit Judge, concurring in the judgment. 
 I cannot agree with the majority that there is no state 
action in this case.  As I read the record, Pennsylvania has 
totally ceded any meaningful responsibility to conduct reviews of 
residency programs to the Accreditation Council for Graduate 
Medical Education (the "ACGME"), and has delegated to the ACGME 
the power to find the critical facts that are necessary for the 
Pennsylvania State Board of Medicine (the "Board") to determine 
whether a residency program satisfies the Board's standards.  In 
essence, the ACGME decides whether residents trained at such a 
facility can be licensed to practice in Pennsylvania.  I believe 
that this delegation of power with respect to a function that 
will have a direct effect on licensing decisions is state action. 
I nevertheless concur in the judgment because I am satisfied 
that, when it withdrew accreditation of McKeesport's surgical 
residency program, the ACGME afforded McKeesport due process. 
 
I.  State Action 
 In this case, as the majority recognizes, a private 
party has taken the decisive step that injured the plaintiff. The 
case is, therefore, not controlled by National Collegiate 
Athletic Association v. Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 109 S. Ct. 454, 
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102 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1988), which involved a situation in which the 
state took the final action that harmed the plaintiff. 
Consequently, we must determine whether state action exists 
either because there is a "nexus" between the Board and the 
ACGME, see Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351, 
95 S. Ct. 449, 453, 42 L. Ed. 2d 477 (1974), or a "joint 
participant" relationship between the Board and the ACGME, see 
Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715, 725, 81 S. 
Ct. 856, 862, 6 L. Ed. 2d 45 (1961).0  In my view there is state 
action under either a "nexus" or "joint participant" approach. 
That is because the relationship between the Board and the ACGME 
is sufficiently direct that the ACGME's functions can be fairly 
attributed to the Board, and because, as the state regulations 
make clear, the Board and the ACGME act in concert in determining 
whether a residency program will be licensed. 
 Although there is little actual participation by 
Pennsylvania in the residency reviews conducted by the ACGME, 
that is because the State has delegated the factfinding role to 
the ACGME.  The importance of this delegation should not be 
underestimated.  The ACGME finds the facts that determine whether 
a residency program should be accredited.  The Board so far has 
not independently reviewed residency programs, nor has it 
demonstrated any inclination to do so in the future.  The Board's 
role, even in light of the Commonwealth Court's decision in 
                                                           
0We have held that the Burton "joint participant" test survived 
the so-called Lugar trilogy.  See Krynicky v. University of 
Pittsburgh, 742 F.2d 94, 101 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 
U.S. 1015, 105 S. Ct. 2018, 85 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1985). 
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McKeesport v. Pennsylvania State Board of Medicine, 628 A.2d 476 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993), seems to be limited to reviewing the 
adequacy of the record developed by the ACGME.  Thus the ACGME, 
in effect, performs the threshold adjudicatory function in 
Pennsylvania's residency program approval scheme.    
 Although Pennsylvania has delegated to the ACGME only a 
threshold adjudicatory power and not the ultimate authority to 
approve the residency programs, it is clear that if the ACGME or 
a similar organization did not exist, the Board would have to 
perform the ACGME's function itself.  See Marlboro Corp. v. 
Association of Independent Colleges & Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d 78, 
80 (1st Cir. 1977) (suggesting that state action exists when it 
appears that if the accreditation agency did not perform its 
function the government would do so itself).  Delegation of this 
function to the ACGME does not change the nature of the function, 
and does not remove the process from constitutional mandates. 
Indeed, the State benefits financially by having the ACGME incur 
the expense of reviewing the programs, something we have said is 
an important factor in finding state action.  See Krynicky v. 
University of Pittsburgh, 742 F.2d 94, 101 & n.9 (3d Cir. 1984), 
cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1015, 105 S. Ct. 2018, 85 L. Ed. 2d 300 
(1985).    
 Moreover, the key accreditation cases upon which the 
majority relies, Medical Institute of Minnesota v. National 
Association of Trade & Technical Schools, 817 F.2d 1310, 1312-14 
(8th Cir. 1987), Peoria School of Business, Inc. v. Accrediting 
Council for Continuing Education & Training, 805 F. Supp. 579, 
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581-83 (N.D. Ill. 1992), and Parsons College v. North Central 
Association of Colleges, 271 F. Supp. 65, 70 (N.D. Ill. 1967), 
differ in critical respects from this case.0  In Medical 
Institute of Minnesota, the plaintiff had claimed that state 
action existed because: 1) the accreditation decision would 
                                                           
0
  The majority also relies on two other cases which, in my 
opinion, do not strengthen its position.  First, the majority 
states that Interfaith Medical Center v. Sabiston, 133 Misc.2d 
308, 309, 507 N.Y.S.2d 124, 125 (1986), aff'd in part and rev'd 
in part on other grounds, 136 A.D.2d 238, 527 N.Y.S.2d 48 (2d 
Dept. 1988), held that the ACGME is not a state actor.  But in 
Interfaith the entire discussion of the state action question was 
as follows: "[t]his court, at its level, will refrain from 
viewing plaintiff's complaint under the doctrine of 'State 
Action' nor expand the doctrine to embrace the allegations of 
plaintiff's complaint."  Id.  There is simply no analysis of the 
question. 
 Second, the majority cites St. Agnes Hospital, Inc. v. 
Riddick, 748 F. Supp. 319, 326-27 (D. Md. 1990) ("St. Agnes II"), 
as a case in which the court cut back on its earlier conclusion 
in St. Agnes Hospital, Inc. v. Riddick, 668 F. Supp. 478, 480 (D. 
Md 1987) ("St. Agnes I"), that the ACGME was a state actor. 
According to the majority, St. Agnes II "questioned its 
conclusion [that the ACGME was a state actor] in light of the 
Supreme Court's decision in [Tarkanian]."  The majority, however, 
ignores the following language from St. Agnes II: 
 
The circumstances of Tarkanian, however, are certainly 
distinguishable from the facts sub judice.  Most 
importantly, the final act that caused the alleged harm 
to Tarkanian was committed by a party conceded to be a 
state actor, while in this case, the ACGME has taken 
the decisive step.  The Court in Tarkanian emphasized 
that the [National Collegiate Athletic Association 
("NCAA")] was not authorized to directly discipline 
Tarkanian or any other state employee.  In St. Agnes, 
the ACGME had the authority and did in fact make the 
final determination to withdraw plaintiff's 
accreditation.  Consequently, Tarkanian is not 
analogous to the situation at hand. 
 
This language hardly supports the majority's implication that St. 
Agnes II reversed itself on its state action conclusion.  To the 
contrary, it appears that the court reaffirmed that the ACGME was 
a state actor. 
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affect eligibility of its students for federal aid; and 2) the 
accreditation agency was regulated by the Department of 
Education.  In Peoria and Parsons, the plaintiffs made the 
eligibility for federal aid argument and added the argument that 
state action existed because the accreditation agency was 
incorporated, and thus a creature of state law. 
 The arguments asserted in those cases were easily 
disposed of under traditional state action doctrine.  Collateral 
consequences of eligibility for federal aid is not enough for 
state action under Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 102 S. Ct. 
2777 (1982); a company is not a state actor merely because it is 
itself regulated, see Jackson, 419 U.S. at 352-55, 95 S. Ct. at 
454-55; and a corporate charter cannot create "state action" 
because such a rule would transform nearly every business entity 
into a state actor, cf. Burton, 365 U.S. at 726, 81 S. Ct. at 862 
(recognizing the need to avoid a rule that creates universal 
application of state actor status).  
 In this case, by contrast, McKeesport can point to much 
more than the collateral consequences of the negative 
accreditation decision, regulation of the accreditation entity, 
or a corporate charter to show state action.  It can point to a 
statute, Pa. Stat. Ann. 63 tit., § 422.23, and a regulation, 49 
Pa. Code § 17.23, which recognize 1) that the facilities of the 
ACGME are better suited to evaluate the programs, and 2) that the 
Board will rely on the ACGME when making its own decisions. 
Indeed § 17.23 recognizes a relationship of "comity" between the 
Board and ACGME which would require a formal exercise of state 
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power to be changed.  The Board made this clear in its briefs 
before the Commonwealth Court:  "In the event the Board should 
choose to withdraw its endorsement [of] the ACGME accreditation 
process, it will do so by amending its regulations."  Although 
the majority fails to recognize this comity between the Board and 
the ACGME, we have said before that such a relationship supports 
a finding of state action when ensconced in regulations.  See 
Krynicky, 742 F.2d at 94 (one factor supporting state action was 
the fact that relationships between the state and two 
universities were defined by statute and regulation, and a formal 
exercise of legislative power would be necessary to change that 
relationship).  
 Additionally, McKeesport can point to the fact that the 
ACGME's decisions have a direct impact on decisions made by the 
Board to recognize residency programs and, ultimately, to license 
doctors.  The directness of this relationship is something that 
the Board itself has demonstrated quite clearly in its briefs 
before the Commonwealth Court by taking the position that it does 
not even have jurisdiction to review the ACGME's decision.  In 
particular, the Board asserted that "[t]he Legislature has not 
conferred upon the Board the authority to be a 'super accrediting 
agency.'"  According to the Board, that power has been delegated: 
"[a]ccreditation by the ACGME is a tool which establishes a 
critical fact leading to the Board's recognition that an 
applicant's training meets the statutory requirements.  This is 
consistent with the Constitution of Pennsylvania and the law 
related to the delegation of governmental functions."  Indeed, 
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the Commonwealth Court accepted this characterization of the 
delegation of power to the ACGME in its opinion interpreting the 
statutory scheme.  McKeesport, 628 A.2d at 479.  
 The majority's statement that such a delegation is not 
enough because the delegation must be of a power which has been 
traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state, is, I 
believe, out of step with current state action doctrine.  To 
begin with, the assertion seems to come too close to saying that 
the only time the exercise of state delegated power can create 
state action is when the power being exercised is traditionally 
the exclusive function of the state.  I am not sure that is even 
a correct statement of the "public function" approach after 
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 111 S. Ct. 
2077, 114 L. Ed. 2d 660 (1991), which seemed to eliminate the 
"exclusivity" requirement of the public function test for state 
action.  Id. at 2083, 2085 (describing the public function 
question as whether "the actor is performing a traditional 
governmental function").  
 A delegation of state authority can certainly show 
nexus or joint participation even if the function is not a 
traditional and exclusive state function.  That is the clear 
implication of Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 195, 109 S. Ct. at 464, 
which asked whether there was a delegation of state power in the 
context of applying the Burton "joint participant" approach.  And 
Tarkanian was not novel in this respect.  Courts commonly hold 
that a state agency, like a county hospital district, for 
example, is a state actor even though it is not engaged in 
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actions that are traditionally the exclusive province of the 
state.  See, e.g., Stern v. Tarrant County Hosp. Dist., 755 F.2d 
430, 433 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1108, 106 S. Ct. 
1957, 90 L. Ed. 2d 365 (1986).  And state agencies are state 
actors largely because they are exercising some form of delegated 
authority.  Id.; see also Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267, 
282, 83 S. Ct. 1122, 1129, 10 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1963) (Douglas, J., 
concurring) (stating that a state agency is a state actor because 
it has the requisite nexus).  Why should not the same be true 
when the state delegates authority to a "private" party?  As 
Edmonson put it, "[t]he fact that the government delegates some 
portion of [its] power to private litigants does not change the 
governmental character of the power exercised."  Edmonson, 111 S. 
Ct. at 2087.0 
 Furthermore, notwithstanding any theoretical 
relationship between the Board and the ACGME, the practical, day-
to-day relationship between the Board and the ACGME evidences a 
delegation sufficient to create state action.  Tarkanian, 
although not controlling, is instructive on this point.  In 
Tarkanian, the Court held that there had not been a sufficient 
delegation of authority to the NCAA in part because the 
University of Nevada at Las Vegas ("UNLV") and the NCAA had 
"acted much more like adversaries than like partners engaged in a 
                                                           
0Nor do I think it makes a difference to the analysis that the 
ACGME claims that Pennsylvania has unilaterally deputized it to 
perform the accreditation decisions for the state.  As I see it, 
the question whether someone is a state actor depends on whether 
it is exercising (or purporting to exercise) state power, not 
whether it has sought such power.  
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dispassionate search for the truth."  Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 196, 
109 S. Ct. at 464.  It was largely on the basis of this 
adversarial relationship that the Court was able to distinguish 
the "joint participant" cases like Burton and Dennis v. Sparks, 
449 U.S. 24, 101 S. Ct. 183, 66 L. Ed. 2d 185 (1980), which had 
found state action in part by concluding that the state and the 
private party had acted in concert.  See Tarkanian, 488 U.S. at 
196 & nn.16, 17; 109 S. Ct. at 464 & nn.16, 17. 
 No such adversarial relationship exists in this case. 
Quite to the contrary, the relationship between the Board and the 
ACGME is extremely close.  As has been mentioned above, the Board 
quite clearly has taken the position that it will in no way 
challenge the ACGME's decisions and will simply rubber stamp any 
decision that the ACGME has made.  Indeed, it does not wish even 
to review the ACGME's decisions, having taken the position that 
it has no jurisdiction over them.  In terms of gauging the 
practical relationship of the Board and the ACGME, the Board's 
arguments are powerful evidence that the Board has done, and will 
continue to do, everything it can to pass off its accreditation 
responsibility to the ACGME.  
 Finally, while it may be true, as the majority states, 
that the accreditation of medical residency facilities is not a 
traditional and exclusive function of the state, there is little 
doubt that the ACGME's decision is a vital component of the 
licensing scheme for residency programs, and, ultimately, of the 
licensing scheme for doctors.  Graduation from an approved and 
accredited residency program is a prerequisite to an unrestricted 
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license to practice medicine in  Pennsylvania.  See Pa. Stat. 
Ann. tit. 63, § 422.29(b).  And licensing of doctors is, by all 
accounts, a traditional and exclusive state function, since it 
lies at the core of the state's police power (to protect the 
health and welfare of its citizens).  We should be careful not to 
permit a state to insulate a critical component of that licensing 
scheme from constitutional requirements simply by delegating that 
component to a private organization. 
 In sum, Pennsylvania has formally deputized the ACGME 
to exercise the state's duty to collect and analyze the critical 
facts for determining the qualification of residency programs; 
the State directly benefits financially from this relationship 
with the ACGME; and the Board and the ACGME act in concert in 
making any accreditation decisions.  I believe that these facts 
make the ACGME a state actor.  I must therefore address the due 
process issues raised on this appeal. 
II.  Due Process 
 Issues of procedural and substantive due process are by 
their nature highly contextual inquiries.  Rules requiring 
adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard, as well as rules 
requiring that decisions be supported by substantial evidence and 
not be arbitrary and capricious, are little more than general 
guideposts when applied to any particular case.  The facts 
dominate the inquiry.  A review of the facts demonstrates that 




1.  The ACGME's procedures. 
 As the majority opinion mentions, the ACGME has in 
place an elaborate accreditation scheme that has both substantive 
and procedural components.  The substantive components are 
specified in The Essentials of Accredited Residencies (the 
"Essentials"), which details the requirements for accreditation. 
Among other things, the Essentials directs residency programs to 
provide certain types of surgical training and to ensure that 
each resident gets a similar range of operative experience.  It 
also directs programs to teach and to maintain a certain level of 
scholarly activity, such as publishing articles in peer-reviewed 
journals.  Programs must be in "substantial compliance" with the 
Essentials to be accredited.  Although this standard leaves the 
ACGME some flexibility when making accreditation decisions, the 
Essentials otherwise provides residency programs with fairly 
detailed guidance regarding the types of clinical and academic 
training they must provide. 
 The procedural components are specified in The Manual 
of Structure and Functions for Graduate Medical Education Review 
Committees (the "Manual"), which outlines the procedures for 
accreditation, including the procedures for withdrawing 
accreditation.  According to the Manual, before an accreditation 
can be withdrawn the ACGME must conduct a seven stage process: 1) 
the program director submits documents to the ACGME; 2) a site 
visit is made by a member of the ACGME field staff; 3) the 
ACGME's Residency Review Committee ("RRC") assembles the 
information and decides whether to withdraw accreditation; 4) the 
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RRC may reconsider an adverse ruling; 5) the ACGME's appeals 
panel decides whether the adverse ruling was supported by 
substantial or credible evidence; 6) the ACGME's Executive 
Committee reviews the appeals panel's ruling, and, if it agrees 
with the adverse ruling, informs the full ACGME; and 7) the 
ACGME, at a plenary session, makes the final decision whether to 
withdraw accreditation.  Throughout the process the residency 
program may submit additional information about the program as 
long as the information relates to the status of the program 
before the review began. 
 
2.  Withdrawal of McKeesport's accreditation.  
 The McKeesport surgical residency program has had a 
long history of substandard performance.  Although it has been 
involved in the accreditation process since the 1960's, it has 
never reached full accreditation status.  The program has 
continuously been engaged in a cycle of provisional 
accreditation, followed by voluntary or involuntary withdrawal of 
accreditation, followed by reapplication. 
 This appeal is part of the latest cycle.  Following its 
review of the McKeesport program in 1989, the RRC voted to grant 
provisional accreditation.  At that time, however, the RRC 
expressed "serious concern" that five areas of the program were 
deficient:  1) basic science education, 2) scholarly activity, 3) 
operative data (which was unreliable), 4) operative experience 
(which was too variable), and 5) numbers of operations in several 
areas (they were insufficient). 
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 The next review, the one at issue here, began in late 
1990.  Despite a generally positive review from the site 
surveyor, the RRC decided to withdraw McKeesport's accreditation. 
The RRC cited five areas of deficiency with citations to the 
relevant parts of the Essentials:  1) lack of scholarly activity, 
2) failure to provide accurate data, 3) inadequate pre- and post-
operative experience, 4) an excessive drop-out rate, and 5) 
otherwise deficient operative experience.  As the RRC's review 
suggests, many of the problems that had been identified in 1989 
remained in 1990. 
 After the adverse recommendation from the RRC, 
McKeesport exhausted all of the internal remedies available to it 
(outlined in the Manual).  It first requested that the RRC 
reconsider its decision.  The RRC complied.  As part of the 
reconsideration procedure, two RRC committee members prepared 
separate reports on McKeesport's program and both recommended 
that RRC sustain the withdrawal of accreditation.  Although the 
RRC rescinded one of the five areas of deficiency (the drop-out 
rate), it reaffirmed its decision to withdraw accreditation. 
 McKeesport then appealed.  At the appeal, McKeesport 
was represented by counsel, made extensive oral argument, and 
submitted four volumes of additional material.  McKeesport also 
questioned one of two RRC members who had reviewed McKeesport 
about the reasons for the withdrawal.  The appeals panel upheld 
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the RRC's decision to withdraw accreditation.0  In summary the 
appeals panel stated that 
                                                           
0It cited the following reasons: 
 
1. [T]here is little independent scholarly activity 
within the Department of Surgery at McKeesport 
Hospital.  The only potential scholarly activity that a 
resident may participate in is by going to another 
institution.  There is no attempt at an ongoing 
clinical research program and there have been no 
articles published in peer-review journals, even though 
there are a few papers that have received awards from 
the local chapter of the American College of Surgeons. 
Each resident allegedly completes a clinical study each 
year.  These reports have not appeared in print.  While 
there is some evidence of resident research projects, 
the four full-time faculty are woefully deficient in 
spite of previous warning[s] in this regard. 
 
2.  After review of the appropriate documents, the 
Appeals Panel recognizes an ongoing inadequacy in the 
accruing of data, not only as to types of operations 
done, but also who has done those operations.  The 
Program Director depends entirely on the house staff to 
accumulate the data and it is often flawed by the fact 
that there has been inadequate participation on the 
part of the Program Director in the data collecting 
process and therefore there is no check and balance 
system.  The Program Director does not know in some 
instances whether the resident has done the case or 
whether it is on a private patient because it will 
always be reported as a first assistant.  These 
continuing flaws in accruing data and monitoring it 
carefully with a check and balance system by the 
Program Director leaves the Board to sustain the 
citation. 
 
3.  Continuation of care by residents is poorly 
documented.  There is a lack of careful follow-up by 
the Program Director or his designee to make sure there 
is continuity of care on the part of the house staff 
either in the public clinic or in the private offices. 
The Panel searched the voluminous records of the public 
clinic and could not find consistent attendance by the 
senior residents.  There is no documented teaching 
during these clinic sessions.  It appears that the 
junior residents attend these clinics, but there is no 
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[t]he surgical leadership at the McKeesport 
Hospital does not fully understand that the 
citations here (insufficient data, continuity 
of care, scholarly activity, and sufficient 
number of operations) are the very fabric by 
which we are judged.  There seems to be 
little recognition that this is important in 
the management of a residency training 
program, and the Board of Appeals therefore 
sustains the recommendation of the Residency 
Review Committee. 
The ACGME accepted the decision of the appeals panel and withdrew 
McKeesport's accreditation. 
 It appears from the record that the ACGME went by the 
book in withdrawing McKeesport's accreditation.  It followed all 
the procedures outlined in the Manual and specified the 
requirements in the Essentials that the hospital had failed to 
meet.  Despite this, the district court concluded that the 
procedures were inadequate and that the ACGME's decision was 
"arbitrary and capricious and not supported by substantial 
evidence."  
                                                                                                                                                                                           
consistent follow-up on the part of the senior 
resident. 
 
4.  Deficiencies in operative experience are well 
documented in the area of vascular, pancreas, 
endocrine, trauma, pediatric, and head and neck 
surgery.  There is by contrast a great sufficiency of 
cases as first assistant.  Instances that are mentioned 
above need to be reemphasized because of the poor 
record keeping; it is impossible to discern whether a 
resident has done a case on a private patient or not 
and, also, there is no evidence that the Program 
Director, follows the cases done by the residents 
carefully, thereby being able to even out the total 
experience of the residents.  There may be adequate 
cases documented for one resident, while his 
counterpart in the same year may have a dearth to none 
of such cases. 
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B. Procedural Due Process 
 The appropriate level of procedural safeguards to 
satisfy due process depends upon a balancing of the factors 
enumerated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335, 96 S. Ct. 
893, 903, 47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976): 1) the private interest at 
stake, 2) the government's countervailing interest, and 3) the 
risk of an erroneous deprivation of the private interest through 
procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or 
substitute procedural safeguards. 
 Although McKeesport has a protectable property interest 
in its license to conduct a surgical residency program, the 
interest is probably not very strong.  Withdrawal of the 
program's accreditation will affect only one part of the 
hospital's operations; indeed it will affect only one of many 
residency training programs the hospital maintains.  Although the 
hospital may lose some federal funding, the ACGME's withdrawal of 
accreditation will not force McKeesport to close its doors.  In 
any event, the hospital may reapply for accreditation if it 
remedies the deficiencies in its surgical residency program. 
 By contrast, the ACGME has a significant interest as an 
accreditation agency in ensuring that the residents in general 
surgery are adequately trained.  Accreditation of a surgical 
residency program in effect certifies to society that those who 
were trained in the program are fit to be surgeons.  Consistent 
with this interest, the procedures the ACGME currently has in 
place are quite detailed.  As has been mentioned, the procedures 
the ACGME employed included 1) notice to McKeesport that its 
34 
accreditation status was in jeopardy, 2) an initial review of the 
program which included a site visit, 3) reconsideration of the 
review in which McKeesport was allowed to present new evidence, 
and 4) review before a separate appeals panel at which McKeesport 
was represented by counsel, and was provided an opportunity to 
present witnesses, question members of the RRC, and present 
additional evidence. 
 The district court believed that these accreditation 
procedures did not satisfy procedural due process because they 
employed vague standards, gave McKeesport inadequate notice, 
placed undue emphasis on past violations, and did not allow 
cross-examination.  I do not believe that any of these supposed 
defects are supported by the evidence or would in any event 
constitute a denial of McKeesport's due process rights.  Curing 
these asserted defects would do little to decrease the risk of an 
erroneous withdrawal, and any additional procedures would seem to 
be of negligible worth when compared to their cost.   
 First, the district court thought two requirements in 
the Essentials, the "substantial compliance" and "operative 
experience" ones, were vague.  In contrast to the district court, 
I believe that the formulation of these requirements preserved 
the ACGME's ability to exercise its professional judgment in 
making accreditation decisions.  More particularly, the ACGME was 
entitled to make a conscious choice in favor of flexible 
standards to accommodate the variations among its member 
institutions, and to avoid forcing all programs into a rigid 
mold.  See St. Agnes II, 748 F. Supp. at 339; Rockland Inst., 
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Div. of Amistad Vocational Schools, Inc. v. Association of Indep. 
Colleges & Schools, 412 F. Supp. 1015, 1018 (C.D. Cal. 1976); 
Parsons College, 271 F. Supp. at 73.  Although the incorporation 
of professional judgment into a professional standard may prevent 
program directors from predicting with mathematical precision 
what will or will not satisfy the standard, it does not make the 
standard unconstitutionally vague, particularly where, as here, 
experienced program directors can develop a good sense of how 
that judgment is commonly exercised.   
 Second, despite the district court's conclusion to the 
contrary, the ACGME gave McKeesport adequate notice of its 
alleged deficiencies.  On several occasions, the ACGME sent 
McKeesport detailed letters of notification stating the areas in 
which McKeesport needed improvement.  After ACGME notified 
McKeesport of the withdrawal, McKeesport again received a 
detailed notice of the RRC's evaluation.  It was even notified of 
specific concerns of the RRC and the appeals panel, and was 
allowed to submit additional information to address those 
concerns.  Such notification procedures were not constitutionally 
infirm. 
 Third, the district court's conclusion that it was 
unfair for the RRC to consider the history of the program when 
making its decision while the appeals panel would not consider 
changes in the program following the RRC's decision, reflects an 
erroneous view of the different functions performed by the RRC 
and the appeals panel.  In the ACGME's accreditation process, the 
RRC makes the original substantive decision with respect to the 
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accreditation.  At that stage, it seems perfectly appropriate to 
take into account past performance as a predictor of future 
performance.  However, at the appeals stage, which is designed 
only to ensure that the RRC acted properly, subsequent changes to 
the program are irrelevant.  Thus there is no unfair asymmetry in 
preventing the program director from presenting evidence of 
changes in the program following the RRC decision.  It is based 
upon the acceptable policy decision to fix the accreditation 
decision at a certain point in time so that the ACGME can make a 
concrete assessment of the program and not face a moving target. 
 Fourth, the district court's conclusion that the 
procedures were infirm because McKeesport could not cross-examine 
and confront the RRC reviewers overstates the constitutional 
requirement of "adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard by 
an appropriate tribunal."  St. Agnes II, 748 F. Supp. at 337 
(internal quotations omitted).  The Constitution requires a 
proceeding appropriate under the circumstances; it does not 
require confrontation and cross-examination in every proceeding. 
See also Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 545, 
105 S. Ct. 1487, 1495, 84 L. Ed. 2d 494 (1985) (stating that a 
pretermination hearing need not be elaborate and that notice and 
an opportunity to respond are the critical components). 
 Cross-examination and confrontation, which are 
generally procedures aimed at resolving questions of historical 
fact that may turn on the credibility of the participants, are 
not absolutely necessary in a procedure related to accreditation 
decisions like the one here.  The ACGME's proceeding is aimed at 
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the application of a standard of quality in a field of medical 
education.  In this case, as in most cases, the facts were 
essentially undisputed.  While the effect that such facts might 
have on the accreditation decision were in dispute, this 
determination was largely a question of professional judgment, 
rather than of credibility.  Confrontation and cross examination 
would have added little to that determination.  Thus the lack of 
such procedures did not deny McKeesport procedural due process.0 
 In short, none of the reasons cited by the district 
court supports the conclusion that McKeesport was likely to 
succeed on the merits of its procedural due process claim.  At 
bottom, McKeesport's claim that the ACGME's procedures violate 
constitutional requirements of due process really rests on the 
proposition that procedures which allow an accrediting body to 
exercise its professional judgment when reaching its decisions 
violate constitutional standards of due process.  But insofar as 
the ACGME's professional judgment is the most important tool it 
                                                           
0Two of the court's other findings, that an inadequate amount of 
time was allotted in the RRC hearing for consideration of 
individual cases and that the ACGME's procedures disregarded the 
site surveyors' findings, are potentially problematic.  Under the 
current ACGME review procedures, only two reviewers carefully 
evaluate the program.  Although their results are then reported 
to the RRC along with a number of other reviews of programs, the 
full membership of the RRC relies on their notes and appears to 
give only perfunctory review to each individual program (50 to 70 
programs are reviewed during a single day-and-a-half session). 
Similarly, the site surveyor, who has in-depth knowledge of the 
program, cannot make recommendations about accreditation.  The 
decisions to limit the review by the RRC of individual programs 
and to limit the role of the site surveyor, however, reflect the 
ACGME's exercise of its judgment as to the procedures appropriate 
for the review of programs, something that I would not lightly 
disturb. 
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has to ensure the quality of residency programs, that proposition 
cannot be correct.   
 
C. Substantive Due Process 
 The district court's conclusion that the ACGME violated 
substantive due process in its review of McKeesport is also 
flawed.  The court's conclusion was based on random entries in 
site surveyors' reports and comments from the RRC reviewers who 
reconsidered the adverse action.  In particular, the court 
pointed to comments by site surveyors to the effect that the 
ACGME tended "to come down strong" on community hospital programs 
(McKeesport is a community hospital), and that the ACGME was 
hostile to programs with large numbers of foreign doctors.0  The 
district court also found that, by the time the appeals panel 
considered McKeesport's program, every claimed deficiency except 
for McKeesport's lack of scholarly activity had been remedied or 
had been deemed insupportable by the evidence. 
                                                           
0The conclusion that the ACGME is biased against foreign trained 
doctors is apparently based on an isolated statement in the 
record from a state observer that the ACGME "sees with a 
jaundiced eye the inclusion of foreign medical graduates in 
residency programs."  There is otherwise little or no support for 
such a finding.  Nevertheless, it is a matter of common knowledge 
that nearly every hospital in the United States (teaching and 
non-teaching) has a significant number of such doctors, and yet 
most teaching hospitals have satisfied the ACGME requirements. 
Moreover, the notion that ACGME is biased against community 
hospitals lacks significant record support.  But whether or not 
the district court's findings were correct on this issue, the 
ACGME's findings were otherwise supported by enough evidence that 
I do not believe that the ACGME ran afoul of substantive due 
process.  
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 But the existence of some evidence contrary to the 
ACGME's decision does not mean that the decision was not 
supported by substantial evidence.  Courts must pay special 
deference to a professional accreditation organization's 
substantive decisions in light of the special expertise required 
to determine professional competency.  See Marjorie Webster 
Junior College, Inc. v. Middle States Ass'n of Colleges and 
Secondary Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 650, 655 (D.C. Cir. (1970), 
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965, 91 S. Ct. 367, 27 L. Ed. 2d 384 
(1970).  And the record shows that the ACGME very carefully 
reviewed the program and found substantial support for at least 
four of the five deficiencies. 
 Following its review of the McKeesport program in 1989, 
the RRC expressed "serious concern" in five areas and stated that 
the next survey would occur in one year.  It is undisputed that 
during the 1990-91 review the program director submitted 
incorrect information to the RRC.  It is also not seriously 
disputed that there was substantial evidence to support the 
ACGME's finding that McKeesport has a deficient level of 
scholarly activity: the ACGME repeatedly complained about 
McKeesport's lack of adequate scholarly activity, particularly 
its lack of peer-reviewed journal articles, and McKeesport does 
not seriously contend otherwise. 
 The ACGME also had substantial evidence to support its 
finding that there were deficiencies in surgical experience at 
McKeesport.  Although the Essentials does not set forth a precise 
number of required operations, the numbers of vascular, pancreas, 
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endocrine, trauma, pediatric, and head and neck operations at 
McKeesport were known, and the most recent data had shown that 
the McKeesport program was unable to provide adequate experience 
in six of the thirteen major categories of surgery.  Of the two 
McKeesport graduates, one was deficient in seven of the defined 
categories, and the other in four.  In the ACGME's professional 
judgment, McKeesport's program did not have the "breadth, depth, 
complexity, and volume to sustain an adequate experience for two 
residents, and that each of these residents did not have what 
[the ACGME] would accept as a broadly based surgical experience." 
This conclusion was within the ACGME's competence to decide and 
was not arbitrary and capricious.   
 In view of the supported ACGME conclusions about 
scholarly activity and surgical experience, both of which it 
considers important criteria for program certification, I am 
satisfied that McKeesport had no probability of success on the 
merits of the substantive due process claim.0 
D.  Common Law Due Process 
                                                           
0Because I believe that McKeesport has not shown a likelihood of 
success on the merits, I need but briefly discuss the balance of 
the harms, but that consideration also militates in favor of 
setting aside the district court's injunction.  To begin with, 
the balance of harms does not clearly favor McKeesport since the 
ACGME, and the state, have a strong interest in maintaining the 
quality of surgeons, and a grant of a preliminary injunction 
would compromise that interest.  Moreover, because the public 
interest in having qualified surgeons is a strong interest 
weighing in the ACGME's favor, I believe that McKeesport would 
have had to make a very strong showing of likelihood of success 
in order to be entitled to a preliminary injunction, something it 
clearly did not do.   
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 McKeesport's complaint averred only a violation of 
constitutional due process.  It appears, however, that McKeesport 
could have also claimed a violation of common law due process (as 
it now seeks leave to amend to do).  Many courts have recognized 
a state or common law duty on the part of "quasi-public" private 
professional organizations or accreditation associations to 
employ fair procedures when making decisions affecting their 
members.  See Wilfred Academy of Hair & Beauty Culture v. 
Southern Ass'n of Colleges & Schools, 957 F.2d 210, 214 (5th Cir. 
1992); Medical Inst. of Minn. v. National Ass'n of Trade & Tech. 
Schools, 817 F.2d 1310, 1313 (8th Cir. 1987); Marlboro Corp. v. 
Association of Indep. Colleges & Schools, Inc., 556 F.2d 78, 79 
(1st Cir. 1977);  Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. Middle 
States Ass'n of Colleges and Secondary Schools, Inc., 432 F.2d 
650, 655 (D.C. Cir. (1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 965, 91 S. Ct. 
367, 27 L. Ed. 2d 384 (1970); Peoria School of Business, Inc. v. 
Accrediting Council for Continuing Educ. & Training, 805 F. Supp. 
579, 582 (N.D. Ill. 1992); St. Agnes II, 748 F. Supp. at 338; 
Interfaith Med. Ctr. v. Sabiston, 136 A.D.2d 238, 242-43, 527 
N.Y.S.2d 48, 50-51 (App. Div. 1988).  Such a common law duty 
appears to exist under Pennsylvania law.  See School Dist. v. 
Pennsylvania Interscholastic Athletic Ass'n, 309 A.2d 353, 357 
(Pa. 1973); Psi Upsilon of Philadelphia v. University of Pa., 591 
A.2d 755, 758-59 (Pa. Super.), appeal denied, 598 A.2d 994 (Pa. 
1991); Boehm v. University of Pa. School of Veterinary Medicine, 
573 A.2d 575, 579 (Pa. Super.), appeal denied, 589 A.2d 687 (Pa. 
1990).  Importantly, unlike the constitutional due process cause 
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of action, the common law due process cause of action has no 
state action requirement.  See St. Agnes II, 748 F. Supp. at 337-
338. 
 McKeesport avers that it should be given the 
opportunity to seek leave to amend its complaint to assert a 
common law due process claim.  I note, however, that the 
requirements of common law due process are quite similar to those 
for constitutional due process, and most courts treat them 
interchangeably.  See, e.g., Marlboro Corp., 556 F.2d at 79; see 
also North Jersey Secretarial School, Inc. v. National Ass'n of 
Trade & Tech. Schools, 597 F. Supp. 477, 479-80 (D.D.C. 1984) 
(stating that accrediting associations owe its members a duty to 
provide fair and impartial procedures, to base decisions on 
substantial evidence, and to avoid arbitrary and capricious 
actions), vacated without op., 802 F.2d 1483 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
Thus, because I believe that McKeesport cannot make out a claim 
for violation of constitutional due process, I doubt that it will 
be able to succeed on a claim for violation of common law due 
process either, though I acknowledge that the question should be 
addressed by the district court in the first instance. 
 
III.  Conclusion 
 While I believe the ACGME is a state actor, I also 
believe that it satisfied the requirements of procedural and 
substantive due process, and consequently, McKeesport had no 
likelihood of success on the merits.  Because I too would reverse 
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the order granting the preliminary injunction, I concur in the 
judgment of the court. 
